LAC adopted this approach in order to maintain the separation between a dispute of interest and one of mutual interest, the latter being subject to arbitration whilst the former is subject to the collective bargaining process (strike action).
In Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 10 the LC disagreed with the reasoning in Samsung and held that the term remuneration as defined in section 213 of the LRA is wide enough to include payment to employees which may be described as benefits. The LC remarked that the statement in Samsung to the effect that a benefit is something extra from remuneration goes too far. It further remarked that the concern that the right to strike will be curtailed if remuneration were to fall within the ambit of benefits need not persist. It based this statement on the reasoning that if the issue in dispute concerns a demand by employees that certain benefits be granted then this is a matter for the collective bargaining process (strike action), but where the issue in dispute concerns the fairness of the employer's conduct then this is subject to arbitration.
11
It is then no surprise that the issue regarding the interpretation of the term benefits once again came before the LAC in Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited v CCMA.
12
The LAC was tasked with deciding if the term could be interpreted to include a benefit which is to be granted subject to the discretion of the employer upon application by the employee. In deciding this, the LAC overturned the decisions in Samsung and Hospersa and opted to follow the decision in Protekon.
Apollo is worthy of note as it is the latest contribution from the LAC regarding the interpretation of the term benefits and it is of binding force for the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 13 and Labour Courts 14 in terms of the principle of stare decisis. The purpose of this note is threefold. Firstly, the facts, arguments and judgment in Apollo will be stated briefly. Secondly, the judgment will be critically 10 Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2005 JOL 14544 (LC) (hereafter referred to as "Protekon").
11
Protekon paras 19, 21-22. 12 Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited v CCMA 2013 ZALAC 3 (hereafter referred to as "Apollo").
13
Hereafter referred to as the CCMA.
14 This includes the LAC.
anaylsed and commented upon. Thirdly, this note will conclude by commenting on the way forward for benefit disputes in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA.
The salient facts
Apollo's case came before the LAC as an appeal from the Labour Court. Hoosen 15 was employed by Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited 16 . During 2008 the appellant informed its employees that it intended to initiate an early retirement scheme 17 . A notice relating to the scheme was placed on the notice boards at the appellant's premises. The notice stated that the scheme would apply only to monthly paid staff who were between the ages of 46 and 59 years old. It stated that a successful applicant would receive two months additional pay and an ex-gratia payment computed on a sliding scale depending on the age of the applicant. It further stated that entry into the scheme would be subject to the discretion of management and that the normal retirement benefits would remain applicable.
Hoosen applied for entry into the scheme but her application was refused on the basis that she needed to be 55 years old in order to qualify for entry, which was the practice of the employer. Hoosen was 49 years old at the relevant time.
18

The crisp issue
The crisp issue for determination was whether an employee who alleges an unfair labour practice relating to the provision of benefits in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA will have a remedy only if such an employee can prove that he/she has a right or entitlement to the benefits ex contractu or ex lege.
19 Put differently, does an employee have a remedy in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA if the benefit is to be granted subject to the discretion of the employer upon application by the employee?
15
Hoosen was the employee party and the third respondent in the appeal before the LAC.
16
Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited was the appellant in the appeal before the LAC.
17
Hereafter referred to as "the scheme".
18
Apollo paras 1-2, 4-5, 8. 19 Apollo para 1.
4
Arguments by both parties
The appellant
The appellant argued that an employee may not rely on section 186(2)(a) of the LRA to create a new right as the section applies only to unfair conduct relating to an existing right. The appellant argued that fairness and clarity dictate that unfair conduct should be reprehensible only with regard to existing rights, and Hospersa provides clarity in this regard as the judgment respects the distinction between a rights dispute and one of mutual interest. The appellant further argued that the resultant of the distinction is that it avoids a situation where new rights may be created by recourse to the unfair labour practice jurisdiction, and thus avoids a duplication of remedies. 
The respondent
The respondent 21 argued that section 186(2)(a) of the LRA does provide a remedy to an aggrieved claimant such as Hoosen, who has no other remedy in the LRA or the common law. The respondent further argued that the term benefit should be construed wider than contractual entitlements 22 as this would be in accordance with the purpose and effect of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction; and Hospersa was incorrectly decided.
23
Judgment
The LAC overturned the decision in Samsung and the resultant authorities 24 which distinguished between remuneration and a benefit as the approach in order to 20 Apollo para 31.
21
Respondent refers to Hoosen, who was the third respondent.
22
One would assume also wider than ex lege entitlements. bargaining; 34 the legislature has intended with regard to section 186(2)(a) 35 to superimpose a duty of fairness regarding employer conduct irrespective of whether that duty exists expressly or impliedly in the contractual provisions that establish the benefit; 36 section 186(2)(a) was introduced primarily to permit the scrutiny of employer conduct, inter alia, the exercise of employer discretion in relation to the provision of benefits; 37 and the term benefits was intended to refer to advantages conferred on employees which did not arise from ex lege or ex contractu entitlements, but which have been granted at the employer's discretion.
38
The LAC (per Musi AJA) postulated the new approach 39 as follows:
In my view, the better approach would be to interpret the term benefit to include a right or entitlement to which the employee is entitled (ex contractu or ex lege including rights judicially created) as well as an advantage or privilege which has been offered or granted to an employee in terms of a policy or practice subject to the employer's discretion. In my judgment "benefit" in section 186(2)(a) of the Act means existing advantages or privileges to which an employee is entitled as a right or granted in terms of a policy or practice subject to the employer's discretion. In as far as Hospersa, GS4 Security and Scheepers postulate a different approach they are, with respect, wrong.
40
The LAC further held that if Hospersa was applied to the facts in casu it would mean that the employer could act with impunity because Hoosen would not have a remedy in the civil courts as no contract came into being Neither would she have a remedy in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA as she does not have a contractual right to the benefit and being a single employee she would not have the right to strike as stated in Samsung. The LAC then stated that in a case like Hoosen's the notion that the benefit must be based on an ex contractu or ex lege entitlement would render section 186 (2) In the light of the above, it is suggested that Apollo correctly rejected the decision in Samsung.
One remaining issue here is the concern echoed in Gaylard that if the term "benefits" includes remuneration then this would preclude strike action. 54 The concern stems from the distinction between a dispute of right and one of mutual interest. The latter is subject to collective bargaining whilst the former is subject to arbitration. The concern is that the right to strike will be curtailed because matters of mutual interest relating to remuneration would be subject to arbitration and be barred from strike action in terms of section 65(1)(c) of the LRA. The concern is misplaced, because a claim to new forms of remuneration will be a matter of mutual interest which is subject to collective bargaining and thus falls outside the scope of arbitration. Disputes concerning unfairness relating to the provision of remuneration 52 Samsung 1368.
53
Grogan Employment Rights 123 states that neither Samsung nor Hambridge has provided compelling reasons as to why disputes concerning remuneration should be excluded from the ambit of s 186(2)(a) of the LRA, as remuneration is the most important benefit to the employee.
54
Gaylard para 22.
are subject to arbitration and will not form the subject matter for collective bargaining.
55
Does the benefit have to exist ex contractu or ex lege?
Apollo rejected the approach in Hospersa to the effect that a benefit has to exist ex lege or ex contractu in order to be arbitrable in terms of section 186 (2) Goldstein AJA held that item 2(1)(b) (now section 186(2)(a) of the LRA) was designed for situations where neither the employment contract nor the common law provided a remedy to the employee. It is thus clear that if it is insisted upon that the benefit must exist ex contractu or ex lege in order to found the remedy in section 186(2)(a) of the LRA then a single employee faced with unfair conduct by her employer in relation to a benefit being granted to her subject to the employer's discretion upon application would be destitute and without remedy. This could never have been the intention of the legislature with regard to the term benefits as an unfair labour practice and it is also contrary to the purpose of the LRA. It is apposite to note that the definition of remuneration in article 141 (2) The concern that a claim to a new benefit could be arbitrable as an unfair labour practice is misplaced. In Apollo's definition, the term benefit refers only to existing rights or entitlements to which the employee is entitled ex contractu or ex lege and existing advantages or privileges to which an employee is entitled as a right or granted in terms of a policy or practice subject to the discretion of the employer.
58
This definition effectively removes the concern that a claim to new benefits may be arbitrable in terms of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. The definition refers only to existing benefits and not to a claim to new benefits. 61 The glaring omission in Apollo is that it did not explain whether or not an employee has that election with regards to a benefit dispute.
In terms of section 65 (1) that the employer has taken certain things or benefits away or has failed to honour the terms and conditions of employment. 64 At first blush it would seem that where an employee alleges a unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment relating to the provision of benefits, the employee will have two avenues available, the first being in the form of strike action 65 as provided for in section 64(4) of the LRA and the second in terms of referring the matter to arbitration as provided for in section 186(2)(a) of the LRA.
66
It is suggested that this anomaly may be resolved by adopting the following approach. Section 186 (2) It is clear upon a reading of s 186(2)(a) of the LRA that the section requires an unfair act or omission that arises between the employer and employee relating to the provision of benefits.
68
The employee would then not be prevented from pursuing a contractual claim in the LC or High the LAC held that the union could not change the true nature of the dispute into a non-justiciable one by merely demanding a remedy which falls outside the ambit of the LRA. The LAC further held that if this were to be allowed it would mean that a dispute normally justiciable or arbitrable in terms of the LRA could be transformed into a strikeable issue simply by adding a demand to a remedy which falls outside the ambit of the LRA. The LAC remarked that this would be unacceptable. See also Protekon para 23 wherein the LC remarked that the court will look at the
Conclusion
The judgment in Apollo is welcomed, as its interpretation of the term benefits accords with section 23 of the Constitution, international law and the purpose of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA. It correctly rejected the distinction between a benefit and remuneration in Samsung as being artificial. The LC in Samsung was concerned with a literal approach to interpreting benefits and disregarded totally the purposive approach. The rejection of Hospersa, likewise, is unassailable because the LC focused on fitting unfair conduct relating to benefits into the realm of a rights dispute, thereby losing sight of the mandatory interpretative method in section 3 of the LRA. Apollo correctly endorsed the decision in Protekon to the effect that a claim to new benefits falls within matters of mutual interest and is subject to the collective bargaining process, whereas a claim that the employer acted unfairly in relation to benefits is subject to arbitration. The most significant finding in Apollo relates to the remark that where an employer acts unfairly in the granting of a benefit to an employee, where it is to be granted subject to the employer's discretion, the only remedy she will have is in terms of section 186(2)(a) of the LRA. In these circumstances section 186(2)(a) of the LRA reigns supreme as it presents an aggrieved employee with the only remedy. This is where the remedy in section 186(2)(a) is most needed. This finding makes the constitutional right to fair labour practices practicable for an aggrieved employee by providing her with an effective remedy. With regard to the impact on the right to strike within the context of section 186(2)(a), section 65(1)(c) of the LRA is conclusive. Employers who grant benefits to their employees subject to their discretion will no longer be able to grant such benefits at their will or fancy but will have to act fairly. Gone are the days when such employees were without remedy. Employers no longer enjoy an unfettered discretion, as Apollo fetters them in accordance with the Constitution. 
